‘Behind the slogans lay an intellectual vacuum’, wrote Henry Kissinger in 1994, warning of the dangers of soundbites over substance in foreign policy. As we reach 219 days into Donald Trump’s second term as US President, and 218 days since he promised to end the war in Ukraine, it appears this warning fell on deaf, or at least damaged ears.
The Trump Administration’s most recent push for a deal in Ukraine initially rested on the initiation of a ceasefire before negotiations could begin. Two weeks later, having met with both Russian President Vladmir Putin in Alaska and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington, ceasefires are out – indeed Russia launched one of its most devastating attacks on Ukrainian civilians shortly after Putin left Alaska. Trump has now promised to organise a meeting between Zelensky and Putin, likely involving discussions over land swaps of sovereign Ukrainian territory. Given that the Ukrainian Constitution prevents the redrawing of its borders by its President, the likelihood of immediate success appears slim.
Speak loudly but carry a small stick?
If we are not to see a fair settlement to the war, or even a ceasefire, further horrors will be endured by Ukrainian civilians and armed forces on both sides. However, it spares the immediate blushes of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. This group of states, led largely by the UK and France has consistently reaffirmed its support for Ukraine, calling for an immediate ceasefire which, in light of America turning its back on European security, it would enforce itself.
These ‘security guarantees’ would involve European forces being stationed in Ukraine. UK Defence Secretary John Healey stated ‘the military plans are complete’ for a pan-European deployment to enforce a ceasefire. Strong slogan.
To be clear, European boots on the ground would have to act as a real deterrent to further Russian aggression. That means being both willing and capable of engaging Russian troops who violate the agreement’s terms.
In February, Zelensky spoke of the need for a force between 100,000 and 150,000 to enforce a peace agreement. In April, the UK’s Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, enquired about raising a combined force of 64,000 with his counterparts in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, and was told that even 25,000 would be challenging. With as many as 600,000 Russian troops currently stationed in occupied Ukraine, and only a vague American commitment of air support from a US President seemingly uninterested in European security – there’s your vacuum.
The end of the end of history
Europe finds itself in this position because of its post-Cold War approach: ignoring both Russian expansionism and America’s faltering commitment to security on the continent.
The Obama Administration showed the first signs of American frustration over European ‘freeloading’ on defence. In 2010, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO faced ‘very serious, long-term, systemic problems’. With only five of NATO’s 28 members reaching their target of spending 2% of GDP on defence, Gates cautioned that underinvestment could tempt ‘miscalculation and aggression’ from hostile states – prophetic.
Europe in turn responded with complacency. From 2010 to 2016, France’s defence spending fell from 1.96 per cent to 1.79 per cent, Britain’s from 2.48 per cent to 2.18 per cent, and Italy’s from 1.35 per cent to 1.12 per cent. By the time President Trump first took office in 2016, European spending on defence was at 1.45% of GDP, while America contributed 4.2%. When Trump called for a 4% contribution from all NATO members in 2018, he was met with ridicule. When he threatened to leave NATO in the same year, it was disregarded as bluster.
At the same time, Europe was ignoring the warning signs of an increasingly belligerent Russia. European sanctions on Russia following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 were weak, and Moscow was largely unpunished for its repeated violations of the Minsk Agreements. Just one year later, Germany signed the Nord Stream II gas agreement, further rendering itself dependent on Russian energy. Even Russian-sponsored assassinations in Europe which resulted in the death of a British citizen were not enough to result in a major change in policy towards Putin’s gangster regime. Finally, when Russian tanks massed along Ukraine’s border in 2021, European states including France and Germany preferred dialogue over arming Kyiv.
Show don’t tell
For now, there appears little prospect of an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, so Europe does not yet have to confront its lack of preparedness for the new security reality on the continent. But predictability is rarely a feature with a Trump presidency. Ukraine could soon find itself forced to accept the terms of a deal it was excluded from, if President Trump grows frustrated with slow progress.
In that eventuality, Europe must be prepared not just with rhetoric but with logistics and clear messaging to the United States. Britain and France must accelerate their long overdue increases to defence spending even in times of economic uncertainty. For UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves that would limit her already constrained approach to tax and spending, the potential impact dashing her hopes for economic growth.
German Chancellor Merz may have to find the courage to stand up to far–left and far-right opposition and move Germany away from its post-Cold War quasi-neutrality, committing troops to the coalition. A commitment to 3% GDP spending on defence across European states would demonstrate to Trump that NATO is following his plans for a reorientation of the organisation’s sharing of responsibility. If Europe can prove it is serious about its own security, Trump may be more inclined to the idea of providing genuine air support to a peacekeeping force, giving the whole idea credibility.
As Kissinger once wrote ‘America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.’ European leaders who ‘have Trump’s ear’, such as Italy’s Giorgia Meloni may provide useful access to the President. But it was Putin, not Europe’s leaders who received the red-carpet treatment.
For now, Trump is enticed by the potential benefits of trade brought by the relaxation of tariffs currently imposed on Russia. It falls to Europe to show him that a credible vision of Western security is the better offer.
